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1. Introduction 
The importance of technological change for the growth and sustain-
ability of economic welfare is well known. In the last fifteen years an-
alytical oriented research resulted in significant progress towards a 
better understanding of the micro-economic forces that contribute to 
shaping firms' innovative activities (Kamien and Schwartz (1982), 
Scherer (1984)). The clarification and testing of the Schumpeterian hy-
potheses on firm size and market structure received considerable atten-
tion. In recent years the game theoretic analysis has served to enrich 
the analytical understanding (see e.g. Reinganum (1984) and Shapiro 
(1985)) of the effects of technological rivalry on the pace of the re-
search and development race, while the incentives created by patent and 
licensing possibilities and the possible impact of the pre- en post-in-
novation market structure scenario has been explored as well. Imitation 
and diffusion activities and the link of innovative activities 1vith the 
strategic positioning of firms likewise received attention (Brander and 
Spencer (1983)). And a beginning has been made with the investigation of 
normative and positive issues related to government's policies towards 
technological change (Spencer and Brander (1983), Spence (1984)). 
The innovative activities of firms located in a small and open eco-
nomy, such as Belgium, raise some specific issues which, despite the 
progress of recent research, do not appear to have been explored in de-
tail. The majority of industries in the Belgian economy are charac-
terized by the presence of ~-~!..t~.J:'!.~~--~-~.J:'!.~.!. ...... iJ:E~~, which may and typically 
will compete with domestic firms, that have no (or less) direct invest-
ments in other national markets. Firms operating with changing technolo-
gies and/or customer and input markets pursue even within the same in-
dustry a variety of succesful strategies. Clusters of firms that follow 
a similar technology or marketing strategy 1 are so called ~~E.~.!.~::!.~~.!?. 
~:1:::~-~P..~· Mobility barriers (Caves and Porter (1977)) may limit the easy 
and quick switch from one group to another and firms can continue to 
earn (normal or above normal) profits within each strategic group. 
It appears reasonable to adopt the working hypothesis that innova-
tive strategy differences are likely to exist between domestic and 
multinational companies, if only because the latter face and shape dif-
ferent internalized technology and input markets. Technological rivalry 
within a multinational company, for example, has intrinsic features of a 
cooperative venture with a maximum extent of spin offs within the firm 
and the realisation of economies of scale and scope. Domestic firms may 
be on a different footing, if only in these dimensions. On an analytical 
level the question emerges whether asymmetries between multinational and 
domestic companies may result in quite different innovative str·ategies 
that !?..~.~-~-~--~-.! in an industry. In addition it remains to be investigated 
on both a conceptual and empirical level, in what strategy dimensions 
the strategic groups differ and if indeed clusters of multinational and 
domestic firms pursue diverse avenues related to success. 
A venture into the asymmetries in innovative strategies in multina-
tional industries should at the very least provide some answers to the 
issues raised above. This paper reports on an attempt to meet this chal-
lenge. A relatively simple game theoretic scenario with firms deciding 
on research and development and production and asymmetries in the multi-
market involvement is rationalized and analysed to understand the possi-
bilities for different strategies to coexist in an industry. It \vill be 
shown that multinational and domestic firms may well pursue different 
research and development strategies given various scenarios of conduct. 
Moreover, data resulting from a survey of "high tech" companies were 
analysed to search for differences in the innovative strategies and in 
scores of perceived and realised success or failure. Sys-tematic diffe-
rences across domestic and multinational firms were sought for. Although 
the usual data and methodological caveats apply, the empirical findings 
are consistent with differences in strategic positioning by both groups 
of firms that all are significantly related to success. 
The next paragraph details a formal scenario to analyze strategic 
differences in multinational industries. Inferences are detailed in a 
consequent section after which the empirical results and conclusions are 
presented. 
2. Multinational industries 
Multinational and domestic firms that pursue different succesful 
strategies may be viewed as belonging to different strategic groups of 
the industry. Viewing strategies in a decision theoretic spirit, i.e. as 
the solution to long-run profit maximisation, clearly has limitations 
for explaining the existence of such strategy clusters. Asynnnetries in 
objectives or the heterogeneity of research and development or produc-
tion technologies (for example, reflected in durable firm specific as-
sets) as well as differences in input or output markets, typically will 
involve diverse strategies. But one of the essential characteristics of 
strategic groups is precisely that corporate strategies differ, not only 
significantly, but also persistently in a ~-:!:~.!?. .. ~.!?. fashion (e. g. Newman 
(1978)). Given that different strategies at least in the short-run in-
volve different levels of profitability, it is not clear why a strategic 
group configuration would be persistent, since one would expect firms 
simply to switch to the succesful one. In the long run the differences 
would evaporate since firms would focus on a (more) unique set of suc-
cesful actions that render a normal return. Mobility barriers related 
for example to entry and exit costs (Caves and Porter (1977)) have been 
introduced to explain why strategic groups persist. 
Instead of focusing on the above decision theoretic view, it appears 
natural to view strategies in a game theoretic framework. It is well 
known that rival firms may be in an asymmetric stable Nash equilibrium, 
regardless of the presence or not of mobility barriers. A stable asym-
metric game theoretic equilibrium say in innovative actions that yields 
normal or above normale profits to the participating firms, involves by 
definition different succesful strategies that coexist in a stable 
fashion. 
Multinational and domestic firms choosing innovative activities will 
be viewed as taking into account the interactions of these strategies 
since they operate in the same industry and are rivals in any given na-
tional market. Multinational companies operate plants and/or distribu-
tion facilities in different (national) markets. Domestic firms only 
have production facilities in one country. Both types of firms may or 
may not export. 
The essence of the multinational firm is, however, that it is opti-
mally tuned to benefit from economies of scale and scope in both R&D and 
market supply. Multinational firms supply commodities which, with very 
little alteration, can be sold in different national markets. The re-
sul ts of R&D can be embodied in the multinational companies' products 
which are sold in a variety of markets. The externalities (spin offs) of 
R&D in one, say home, market on the supply in other markets are inter-
nalized in the multinational company. This internalisation can be viewed 
as a response to adverse selection and moral hazard problems that accom-
pany asymmetries in information connected with licensing agreements 
(Caves (1984), p. 204-207). Multinational companies may in these circum-
stances prefer not to license the innovation to rival (domestic) firms 
because of strategic reasons 2 
A simple scenario can be set up to highlight and analyze the innova-
tive strategies of multinational and domestic firms. Consider an indus-
try with two markets. Consumer preferences may, but need not, be diffe-
rent across markets. Serving both markets from one market involves a 
"transaction cost" related say to transportation and or distribution 
(incl. marketing). There are two firms, one of which is a multinational 
that operates with "low" transaction costs tm. The other, domestic firm, 
has "high" transaction costs tct. Even if the markets are identical in 
demand conditions and if both firms produce perfect substitutes intra-
industry trade will occur in a Nash equilibrium (Brander (1981), Neven 
and Phlips (1985)) provided tct is not too high compared with trn. The 
transaction cost advantage is posited to be sufficiently important so 
that only the multinational serves both markets and the domestic firm is 
limited to the first market. The "membership game" in which the firms 
achieve the initial cost advantage is not looked at. Both firms can be 
thought of as having been involved in some uncertain innovative race, in 
which the winner becomes the multinational firm and the loser or imita-
tor is nevertheless able to capture part of the market 3 • The multina-
tional firm and the domestic firm operate in a duopoly in market one and 
the former has a monopoly in the market two. 
The intention is not to develop a theory, but rather to illustrate 
underlying economic tendencies, hence it is useful to employ simple 
functional specifications. Firm demand is supposed to be linear and pro-
duction cost co~stant. R&D expenditures are supposed to be product ori-
ented and to shift the intercept of the firm's linear demand curves. 
This specification has the advantage that the game can also be inter-
preted (mutatis mutandi) as a cost reducing game (see Katz (1985)). 4 
The multinational firm's inverse demand curve in marl<et one is 
p1m = a1m(x)- u- l3v, with a1m(x) the intercept. The price p1m is a 
function of the "stock of knowledge" x available in the firm and of the 
output u and v of respectively the multinational and domestic firm. The 
domestic firm faces pd = ad(y) - v- j3u, withy the stock of knowledge 
available in this firm. Both companies produce substitutes but products 
may nevertheless be differentiated (given that 0 ~ 13 ~ 1). 5 For 13 = 0 
products are differentiated to the extent that firms have a monopoly in 
segments of market one. In its home market the demand curve for the mul-
tinational is pzm = azm (x) - ow, with w the production of this firm in 
market two. Note that the multinational is transferring "costlessly" its 
stock of knowledge to both markets. Diminishing returns are assumed, 
i.e. d2 a1m/dx2 < 0, d2 azm/dx2 < 0 and d2 adjdy2 < 0. 
Unit production costs are constant for both firms, and equal to c1 m 
and czm for the operations of the multinational in market one and t~vo 
respectively and cct for the domestic firm. The cost c1m equals c2 m + tm 
with tm the transaction cost. 
R&D expenditures are r and s for the multinational and domestic firm 
respectively. There are possibly spin offs from one company to the 
other. The stock of knowledge in the multinational is x = r + 0ctrns and 
for the domestic firm it is y = s + 0md r. The spin-off parameters are 
constants related for example to technology and are bounded, i.e. 0 s 
0ctm s l and 0 s 0md s l. 6 In summary 
Market I Market 2 
Output u w 
R&D exp r 
Multinational Knowledge m 0.;; ¢~.;; x = r + <l>d s I 
firm m m m m Demand 
"I = CL I (x) - u - s.v Pz = "'z(x) - ow 
Unit costs m = m tm m c c2 + cz I 
Output v 
R&D exp s 
Domestic Knowledge y - s + <l>d r 
' 
0 < <f>d .;; I 
m m 
firm Demand d = ad(y) v - ~.u r -
Unit costs d 
c 
Table l The multinational firm industry setting 
Equilibrium in the described multinational industries can be charac-
terized using different solution concepts. Both noncooperative and 
cooperative conduct will be explored. 
3. Strategic R&D in multinational industries. 
Firms are deciding on levels of R&D expenditures that will result in 
product (or process) improvements or novelties, realizing that output 
decisions will be made contingent on the outcome of the innovative ac-
tivities. A two stage game is considered, with the R&D game played in 
the first stage and the output game in the second one, given that the 
outcome of the first play is knm.Jn 7 • The game is solved through back-
ward induction i.e. a feedback equilibrium concept (sub game perfect 
equilibrium) (Basar and Olsder ( 1982)) is used. The intention is to 
characterise circumstances in which innovative strategic groups with 
multinational and domestic firms arise. 
3.1. Noncooperative equilibria. 
The major focus is on a Nash equilibrium, some comments on a 
Stackelberg scenario will also be given before moving to the cooperative 
situation. The value of the multinational and domestic firm at the be-
ginning of the second stage is respectively 
and 
n:d = v(ad - cd - v - [3u) 
The Nash equilibrium of the output game played in this last period is 
u*, v*, w*, with n:m(u*,v*,w*) =max n:m(u,v*,w) and 
u,w 
n:d (u*, v*) = max n:d (u*, v). It is easily verified that 
v 
2 m1m - f3md 2 md - f3m1m ill2m 
u* = -----------
' 
v* ::: ----------- w* ::: 
' 4-[32 4-[32 28 
(l) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Asymmetric demand-cost-margins m1m, md, m2m do not prevent the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium with positive outputs and profits, provided 
The R&D investment decision is taken in the first stage of the gruue, 
with both the multinational and domestic firm realizing that the innova-
tive strategies chosen are irreversible and that the outcome as re-
fleeted in the magnitude of the firm's demand curve will be observed be-
fore the output game. Firms have perfect foresight as to the equilibrium 
of this second stage game. The objective functions of resp. the multina-
tional and the domestic firm are 8 
vm = 11:m ( u* ( r , s ) , v* ( r , s ) , w* ( r , s ) , r , s ) - r (5) 
and 
vct = n:d ( u* ( r, s) , v* ( r, s) , r, s) - s (6) 
with u*(r,s), v*(r,s) and w*(r,s) defined through (3) and the knowledge 
levels x = r + 0ctm s and y = s + 0md r. Given the Nash property of the 
outputs levels it is clear that 0 = 3 vm /3 u* = 3 vm /3 '"* = 3 vct /3 v*. 
The first stage of the subgame perfect equilibrium is the Nash equi-
librium r*, s* such that vm (r* ,s*) = max vm (r,s*) and 
r 
vct (r* ,s*) = max vct (r* ,s). The equilibriwn r* ,s* solves therefore both 9 
s 
= 0 = + [ - l ] (7) 
Clr av* 3r 3r 
and 
(4) 
Asymmetric demand-cost-margins m1m, mct, m2m do not prevent the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium with positive outputs and profits, provided 
The R&D investment decision is taken in the first stage of the game, 
with both the multinational and domestic firm realizing that the innova-
tive strategies chosen ·are irreversible and that the outcome as re-
fleeted in the magnitude of the firm's demand curve will be observed be-
fore the output game. Firms have perfect foresight as to the equilibrium 
of this second stage game. The objective functions of resp. the multina-
tional and the domestic firm are 8 
vm = TCm ( u* ( r, s) , v* ( r, s) , w* ( r, s) , r, s) - r (5) 
and 
yct = TCct ( u* ( r, s) , v* ( r, s) , r, s) - s (6) 
with u* (r,s), v* (r,s) and w* (r,s) defined through (3) and the knowledge 
levels x = r + 0ctm s and y = s + 0md r. Given the Nash property of the 
outputs levels it is clear that 0 = a vm ;au* = a vm ;a w* = a yct /a v* . 
The first stage of the subgame perfect equilibrium is the Nash equi-
librium r*, s* such that vm(r*,s*) =max vm(r,s*) and 
r 
Vd(r*,s*) =max Vd(r*,s). The equilibrium r*,s' solves therefore both 9 
s 
= 0 = + [ - 1 J (7) 
ar av* ar ar 
and 
au* 
= 0 = + [ - l J (8) 
as au* as as 
as well as (3). Although the reaction curves in r and s need not neces-
sarily be downward sloping the subsequent discussion will only focus on 
this case 10 • In addition it is assumed that the second-order optimality 
conditions are satisfied and that own effects of R&D on marginal profit 
dominate cross effects, i.e.: 
a2vmlar2 < a2vmlaras and a2Vctlas2 < a2Vdlasar 11 
.ll] 
To understand the feedback Nash equilibrium, note that each firm 
takes into account the direct consequences on the profits, represented 
by the expression between brackets, as well as the strategic effects of 
R&D decisions. If the firms were to decide on r, s and output simul-
taneously instead of sequentially, i.e. if they were to decide on open 
loop strategies, the strategic terms would be ignored. The sign of the 
feedback effects is dependent on the spillovers since 
av* 
= (2 0md.dadldy- ~.da1mldx) I ( 4-[32 ) (9) 
ar 
and 
au* 
= (2 0ctm.da1mldx- f3.dadldy) I ( 4-132 ) (10) 
as 
while 
anm a?td 
v. = u. = - 13 u v :$ 0 (ll) 
av au 
For zero spill overs an increase in R&D results in a decrease in the ri-
vals output and hence in an increase in profitability. Hence the feed-
back equilibrium levels are larger than the open loop decisions that ig-
nore these strategic positioning (Brander and Spencer (1983)). For posi-
"! 'j 
.l .. l. 
tive between firm spill overs (e.g. 0mct = 0ctm = l) this need not hold 
12, since a larger R&D effort may result in an increase in rival's out-
put and a negative impact on own profits 13 
Of central concern here is whether the asymmetries between the 
multinational and domestic firm, for example with respect to the demand 
cost margin and spin offs are accompanied with different innovative 
strategies. A feedback Nash equilibrium with r* different from s* may be 
interpreted as both firms belonging to a different strategic group. To 
extract some possible basic tendencies let 
1zm ?: 0 (12) 
with ~ < l to reflect diminishing returns towards increasing knowledge 
levels. Both firms are equally productive in transferring a given stock 
of knowledge into additional demand 14 • Using the mean value theorem 
(see Appendix 1 and 2) it can be verified that as long as the described 
scenario and functional specifications apply, while R&D is a strategic 
substitute 15 , the multinational company's equilibrium strategy may be 
"more" or "less" innovative than the domestic company's. The mul tina-
tional's equilibrium expenditures r* will be greater (smaller) than the 
domestic firm's investments s* if and only if$N is positive (negative), 
with 
(13) 
(14) 
and the margins evaluated at symmetric R&D levels. 
The multinational firm will be part of a more innovative strategic 
group, to capitalize on the spin offs in both markets and the lower 
transaction costs in a broad set of circumstances. Indeed, 1J; N > 0 and 
r* > s* if the spill-overs 1?..~.~-'='-~-~.!":1 companies are identical (0md = 0ctm = 
0 ~ 0) and m1m ~ md. The demand-cost margins are to be evaluated at sym-
metric R&D levels, hence in view of (12) 
tm) + ( cd - cz m) - l d (15) 
since Cl m = czm + tm. When both firms are equally efficient in their 
home markets (cd = czm), the multinational will be more innovative if it 
is positioned in a sufficiently important market segment compared with 
the domestic firm. The large original market ( h m) is more than compen-
sating the transaction cost of serving the foreign market 
(hm - tm > ld). These tendencies are reinforced if the multinational 
firm has a cost advantage (say because of its size) in the production 
(cd - czm > 0). In the described scenarios one may observe domestic 
firms "focusing" on "niches" in the market with relatively modest inno-
vative activities compared to multinational firms that within the same 
industry are positioned in large market segments. With R&D focusing on 
new products (l1m = ld = 0) the multinational is in the present context 
less likely to be positioned in the more innovative strategic group, un-
less it has a significant cost advantage (cd - c1m > 0). 
The between firm spin offs help to determine the asymmetries in in-
novative effort, since 
81/JN 
= b f3 ( 2md - f3m1 m ) > 0 for (m1 m /mct) < 2/[3 (16) 
80ctm 
and 
81/JN [3 
= f3( f3md - 2m1 m) < 0 for - < (ml m jmd) (17) 
80mct 2 
Provided that the multinational demand cost margins differ from the do-
mestic ones within the bounds indicated 16 , it is more likely that the 
multinational firm will be in the more innovative strategic group as the 
spin offs towards (from) the domestic firms decrease (increase). One of 
the inferences that can be drawn is that a higher cost domestic firm may 
well be part of a more innovative cluster which is in equilibrium with 
less innovative multinational firms, in particular if the spin offs from 
the multinational company are important and the externalities towards 
this firm are low. For this to happen it is necessary that the domestic 
firm has a sufficiently large market segment to begin with, i.e. say be-
fore the product improvement R&D venture. To verify this let 0mct = l, 
0ctm = 0 and ((4-[32)2/45)) ~ l. It is easily verified that 
(18) 
with k1 = 2 1 ->~. Only for ld sufficiently large ([3 > 0 and 1-l sufficiently 
close to one) it is possible that 1jJ N < 0 and s* > r*. 
To obtain some insights as to the sensitivity of the inferences to 
the equilibrium concept, a Stackelberg feedback equilibrium can be ana-
lyzed (see Appendix 3, A.3.l.). The multinational firm, for example, may 
be leading in both the output and R&D game with the domestic firm deci-
ding on its best response given the decisions of the other firm. As long 
as R&D is a strategic substitute among the firms (ds/dr < O) and the 
spill over between firms are not too large, the multinational firm is 
likely to be positioned in a more innovative strategic group even in 
circumstances where in a Nash equilibrium this firm would focus on less 
innovative policies than the domestic firm.l 7 These circumstances and 
m1m ~ md are also sufficient for the multinational to spend more on R&D 
than the domestic firm, for any value of ~. 0 < ~ < 1. 
3.2. Cooperative equilibria. 
Both the multinational and domestic firm may realize that industry 
profitability (in market one) can be improved upon by cooperation. The 
question emerges what impact cooperation may have on the observed 
strategic clusters and on the extent of the R&D efforts of the firms and 
the industry. Two scenarios seem to be of interest: a joint venture in 
R&D but competition (Nash) in the output game and cooperation in both 
R&D and production. 
With a joint venture in R&D and Nash in the last stage, the multina-
tional and domestic firms continue to produce Nash output levels u*, v* 
and w* as defined by (3), given the knowledge resulting from the coope-
rati ve R&D game. In the first stage r and s are chosen with perfect 
foresight as to these output levels and with the objective of maximizing 
industry profits V = vm + vct, with vm and vct defined by (5) and (6). The 
resulting cooperative R&D decisions r" and S 0 solve therefore: 
av 
= 0 = 
ar av* 
a v* 
--- + 
ar au* 
au* 
+ [ 
ar ar 
a 7Lct 
+ --- - l ] 
ar 
(19) 
av 
= 0 = 
as av* 
av* 
as 
a1Cd 
+ ---
au* 
au* 
+ [ 
as as 
a11:d 
+ --- - l J 
as 
J.5 
(20) 
as well as (3). The direct consequences of R&D on industry profits are 
again represented by the expression between square brackets. Open loop 
cooperative R&D strategies are obtained by equating these terms to zero. 
The indirect or strategic effects of R&D are represented by the other 
terms; the joint venture incorporates the strategic impact on both the 
profits of the multinational and the domestic firm. The equation for 
av*/ar and au*/as were defined earlier ((7) and (8)). It is easily 
verified that 
au* 
= (2.dalm/dx- ~.Bbd.dadjdy)/(4-~2) (21) 
a r 
and 
a v* 
= (2.dadjdy- ~.0dm.dalm/dx)/(4-p2 ) (22) 
as 
while the impact of output changes on the other firm's profits is still 
negative (see (11)). Given the functional specifications for the depen-
dence of demand on knowledge, the total strategic effect is negative for 
m1m ?: md 18 • Given that the multinational demand cost margin is not 
smaller than the domestic nrm's margin, the total s.trB:tegic (feedback) 
RP.D •:ff.?.E! ( r· + s ·) will be ~n.1.1:'.:~Jt:!r: than the ?.Pt:!!:l.}?.?P efforts in joint 
R&D venture and Nash output scenario. This holds regardless of the spin 
offs between the companies and is the reverse of the inferences drawn 
with Nash R&D behavior (and small spin offs) 19 
In the joint venture on strategic R&D the multinational firms will 
spend more (less) on innovative strategies as ~c is positive (negative) 
with 
(23) 
and k1 defined by (14). 
Provided that m1m ~ md the domestic firm will contribute less to R&D if 
[(l+0ctm)/(l+0md)]~-l (l-0ctm) ~ (l-0md). Equal but less than perfect 
spill 'overs are sufficient for the multinntiom1l firm to spr'nci morP be-
cause of the perfect spin off's within the firm. With perfect between 
firm spin offs (0ctm = 0md = l) there exists a symmetric solution in the 
joint venture. 
A comparison of the joint venture R&D efforts r·, s· with the Nash 
levels r*, s* is possible, noting that the necessary condition (19) and 
(20) of the joint venture can be rewritten as: 
av a n:m a v* a n:m a n:ct au* a n:d 
= 0 = --- + - l ] + --- + (24) 
ar a v* ar ar au* ar ar 
and 
av a 1td au* a 1td a 1tm av* a n:m 
= 0 = --- + - l J + --- + (25) 
as au* as as a v* as as 
The Nash equilibrium is defined by looldng at the impact of R&D on Oh'n 
profits, given the Nash strategy of the other firm. Formally r* and s* 
solves the expressions between square brackets (cfr. (7) and (8)). The 
J / 
joint venture on R&D also incorporates the effects of R&D on the other 
firms. For example for the R&D efforts of the multinational: 
au* 
ou* 
--- + 
ar ar 
v* 
=- ---- (2.dalm/dx- ~.0md.dadjdy) 
c 4-rs2 > 
+ v* dad /dy 0md 
For positive spin offs from the multinational to the domestic firm, the 
joint venture takes into account the negative effect of an increase in r 
on domestic firm profits because of the increase in the multinational 
firm's output as well as the positive effect on the domestic firm's 
demand because of the spin off. One would expect this positive effect to 
dominate if 0md is close or equal to one in which case the multinational 
would spend more on R&D in the joint venture than in a Nash scenario. Of 
course a countervailing tendency would result from spin offs from the 
domestic firm. In fact r* > ro follows if indeed 0md = l and 0ctm = 0. 
These and other inferences are summarized in Table 2 (see Appendix 3, 
A.3.2.). They all can be rationalized along similar lines. 
r* + s* > r 0 + s · 
r* + s* < ro + s" 
r* > r· s* < s • 
r* < r" s* > s 0 
Table 2: Comparison of Nash R&D strategies r* and s* 
wT'tE'''"strategies r. and s. resulting from R&D 
joint venture and Nash output behavior. 
The multinational company (m) spends r, the domestic firm 
(d) s. 0iJ indicates between firm spin offs. 
The findings confirm that spill overs are an important determinant of 
R&D strategies. With low externalities between firms, Nash strategies 
result in highly innovative industries. With important spin offs joint 
ventures in R&D may well result in more R&D 20 
Finally it may be argued that a joint venture in R&D perhaps renders 
Nash behavior in output less likely. A complete cooperative setting in 
both R&D and output with both the multinational and domestic firm pro-
ducing in market one, result in output levels 
m1m - 13md md - l3m1 m 
-u = ----------- v = (26) 
2 ( 1-132 ) 2(1-132 ) 
for 0 ::;; 13 < 1, and 
m1 m + md 
u = v = ---------- with m1m = md (27) 
8 
for 13 = 1, 0ctm = 0md = 1, a1m = ad and x=y. The output of the multina-
tional in the home market stays mzm /20. In the first stage R&D levels 
-
are chosen to maximize industry profits V, taking into account the opti-
mal output levels. The optimal R&D values solve 
av a xm a xd 
= --- + - l = 0 (28) 
ar ar ar 
and 
av a xm a xd 
= --- + - 1 = 0 (29) 
as as as 
evaluated at u, v and mzm/20. The open loop and feedback strategies are 
the same since the pr·oblem is reduced to a decision theoretic str-ucture. 
The spin offs are an essential determinant of the possible asymmetries 
in R&D investment as Table 3 illustrates.21 
Osl3<1 
rs(::::)s as 
0md=0ctm=O [ ( ml m - mct ) * + 
1112 m (l-(3)/o]s(::::)O 
r = s 
r: < s 
r: > s 
m1 m + 
r· >r 
s·<s 
s a 
Ambiguous 
Ambiguous 
with * evaluated at symmetric R&D levels 
+ evaluated at r and s 
0<13<1 
m1 m + 
a < --- < b 
mct 
r·+s·<r+s 
a= (3(8+(32 )/(4+5(32 ) and b = (4+5(32 )/13(8+(32 ) 
m1m + 
--- :::: b 
mct 
r·<r 
s·>s 
Ambiguous 
Ambiguous 
Table 3 : Results on cooperative R&D expenditures r and s. Comparison 
is ..... wlii1 strategies r· and s • resulting from R&D joint venture and Nash 
output behavior. 0ij indicates between firm spin offs. For (3=0 clearly 
r·=r and s·=s. For homogeneous products ((3=1, 0ctm=~nd=l, a1m=ad=a, x=y) 
R&D expenditures are symmetric : r=s, and r·+s·<r+s. 
The complete cooperation results in a ~ .. t::!?..~ innovative industt'y than 
would apply with only a J ..<?. .. ~_I.}_! ....... Y.~E!.l::l.E:.~ ........ ~.I.} ......... :f.l.?.<.J?. that seeks <?.P..t::!I.} ....... J.<?..<?.J2 
strategies. The reason is that the overall cooperation restricts its in-
dustry output to the monopoly level, while the joint venture seeks in 
the open loop fashion, simultaneously with its R&D strategies, a larger 
Nash output and hence more R&D 22 • The strategic R&D levels with a joint 
venture on R&D, however, are typically lower than the open loop values. 
If output levels are chosen in a Nash way after knowledge levels are ob-
served, the joint R&D venture also has an incentive to restrict R&D. The 
question is whether this negative incentive is sufficient to result in 
strategic R&D levels below the complete cooperation levels. It can be 
verified, that the strategic considerations of the R&D joint venture are 
apparently important enough in the present framework to result in lower 
industry R&D if competition in output prevails than if cooperative 
output levels are chosen ( r· + s. < r + s) in a wide set of circum-
stances (see Table 3). 
:?U 
4. Innovative strategic groups: some first empirical results. 
The analyzed game theoretic scenarios clearly point to the possible 
existence of innovative strategic groups in multinational industries. 
Empiricism does suggest asymmetries between the innovative efforts of 
domestic and multinational firms as reflected, say in their reported R&D 
expenditures (Hirschey (1981)). An empirical test of the obtained in-
ferences needs to go beyond simple measures of innovative input and of 
resulting economic performance. The innovative inputs and performance of 
a multinational's subsidiary may be a weak indicator of the overall com-
pany's strategy and performance. A company's innovative strategy, more-
over, can hardly be summarized in one single input variable, nor can it 
be viewed in isolation from the production and marketing strategies. 
The empirical exploration consequently focused on a multi variate 
measurement of strategy and performance on the basis of survey data, ob-
tained from companies operating in eleven multinational industries 23 
Only companies that operate at least one R&D and production unit in Bel-
gium in the selected (high-tech) industries were contacted. Of the 222 
companies which were found to be actively engaged in development and 
marketing of new products and processes, 140 completed the question-
naires. The survey contained 66 questions on the strategy of the compa-
nies 24 • Strategies could be typified by answering queries about: 
-the nature of the marketed products (16 questions); 
-the nature of the market in which the firms operate (20 questions); 
-the adopted technology and production characteristics (ll questions); 
- the specific features of the R&D and marketing processes 
within the company (19 questions). 
:2.1 
In addition, a set of 9 questions asked for the performance in terms of 
success and failure obtained from the development and introduction of 
new products and the contribution to the overall performance of the com-
pany. 
The survey data thus provided subjective assessments of both strate-
gy and performance. The limitations of this approach are clear. It was 
possible, however, to grasp to some extent the innovative strategies of 
the multinational companies not only in terms of the local subsidiary 
company itself, but also in view of the overall firm positioning in 
technology and product markets. The performance evaluations also are 
sufficiently broad to emcompass their impact in the multimarket environ-
ment. 
4.1. Measuring innovative strategies and performance 
A principal component analysis was applied to the survey results to 
deal with the multidimensional character of strategy and to identify 
strategic factors from the information available. The results were de-
rived from the 66 questions dealing with strategy as discussed above 
supplemented with three questions asking for a subjective evaluation by 
the company managers of the state of development of the technology and 
the market. The analysis led to ten interpretable strategy dimensions, 
which together accounted for 60 % of all variance and are given in Table 
4. 
TECHNOLOGY ORIENTED STRATEGIES 
PRINl : Emphasis on innovation 
High technology products, new products, first of 
their kind, leader in the technology race, R&D is 
main strategy 
PRIN2 : Scope of innovation 
New products fit into the existing products 
assortement, new products can use the same 
production unit, marketing and distribution 
channels, ... 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
PRIN3 : Intensive marketing towards existing large markets 
Strongly market and marketing-oriented, market push 
innovations, markets are large, high (potential) 
sales. 
PRIN4 : Market driven specialisation (niche-strategy) 
Very little competition on the output market, 
products are of high quality without being 
technically complex, emphasis on marketing 
instruments to develop new markets. 
PRINS : New penetration of existing markets 
New marketing and distribution channels, large 
potential of customers to be tapped. 
SPECIFIC STRATEGIES COUPLED WITH STABILIZING TECHNOLOGIES 
OR MARKETS 
PRIN6 : Technological race in competitive markets 
Technology push innovations, innovations aimed at 
undercutting the market price, highly competitive 
setting. 
PRIN7 : Image building product differentiation of high 
cost products 
High unit cost, high risk products, highly 
competitive, small output market, offensively 
differentiating through image building, emphasis on 
marketing rather than on R&D. 
PRIN8 : Reputation based sypply of efficient equipment 
goods 
Stable technology, low growth, marketing instruments 
focuses on building and maintaining reputation of 
being highly qualitive, unique, efficient, cost 
saving. 
PRIN9 : Market squeezing 
Offensive marketing strategy oriented towards 
segments of the market not already fully exploited, 
products offered have no comparative advantage. 
PRINlO: R&D- led product differentiation of low cost 
products 
R&D aiming at differentiating technologically low 
risk products. 
Table 4: Identification of 10 principal strategy components. The distin-
guishing features (responses to survey questions) are given below the 
lables of the strategy dimension. 
Two performance measures were derived from a principal component 
analysis applied to the set of questions dealing with the objective and 
subjective evaluation of success of the company's introduction of new 
products. The components account for 56 per cent of total variance and 
are summarized in Table 5 zs 
SUC: Degree of success 
Global evaluation of the company's performance, 
contribution of new products to profit performance, 
evaluation with respect to competitive location of the 
company, evaluation with respect to initial targets set 
out by the company, contribution of new products to sales 
revenue, per cent of new products that have been 
successfully developed and commercialized. 
FAIL: Incidence of product innovations failures 
Percentage of new products whose development was not 
commercialized, percentage of new products for which 
commercialization failed. 
Table 5: Performance components. 
4.2. Differences between domestic and multinational companies. 
~:.~ :.-.::: 
In order to examine the existence of systematic differences between 
multinational and domestic companies, the standard hypothesis is tested 
whether these companies belong to the same population with respect to 
the different performance and innovative strategy factors 2 6 
Statistically significant differences show up for five of the ten 
strategy components, see Table 6. 
==================================== 
DOM 
PRINl -0.367 
PRIN2 -0.200 
PRIN3 -0.276 
PRIN4 0.276 
PRIN5 0.126 
PRIN6 0.383 
PRIN7 -0.004 
PRINS -0.237 
PRIN9 -0.092 
PRINlO 0.250 
N 63 
MNC 
0.559 
0.447 
0.301 
-0.293 
-0.108 
-0.227 
0.078 
0.060 
0.015 
-0.193 
61 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
==================================== 
T~!? .. ~.~ §: Average scores of strategy components for domestic (DOM) and 
multinational (MNC) companies. * Indicates significantly different mean 
values for a 10 % confidence level. N is the sample size. 
A marked difference is found for the strategy dimensions: PRINl, 
PRIN3, PRIN4, PRIN6 and PRINlO. (The first factor PRINl, takes account 
of 15 per cent of all variance of the survey results.) These findings 
imply that multinationals are more innovation-oriented than Belgian 
domestic companies (PRINl) and tend to develop their products more for 
large markets (PRIN3). Domestic firms, on the other hand, score signifi-
cantly high with respect to market niche strategies (PRIN4) and product 
differentiation (PRINlO). The necessity of R&D, as a weapon to stay com-
petitive vis-a-vis rivals appears also more typical for domestic compa-
nies than for multinational companies (PRIN6). 
With respect to the performance components, no statistically signi-
ficru1t difference is found (using a 10 per cent significance criterion) 
between domestic and multinational companies. Repeating the same test, 
but controlling for different industries, only a significant difference 
is found in the telematics industry, where multinational companies seem 
to .f.?.:~ .. !. less than domestic companies. The difference is not matched with 
a similar difference for the success indicator. 
The different strategy dimensions of multinational and domestic 
firms appear to be accompanied with similar perceived performance. To 
understand the coexistence of different strategies, it is useful to re-
late the strategy and performance indicators. From regressing strategy 
dimensions on the company's performance, it· is interesting to find co-
efficients significantly different from zero for the strategy dimensions 
PRINl - PRIN4, together with PRINlO. 
Except for PRIN2 these strategy dimensions are also the ones which 
are found to differ significantly for domestic and foreign controlled 
:?.;:::1 
================================================================== 
sue FAIL 
(l) (2) (3) (4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERC .0.057 -0.054 0.091 0.134 
(0.287) (0.287) (0.205) (0.209) 
PRIN1 0.193 ** 0.127 ** 0.123 ** 0.149 ** (0.055) (0.062) (0.039) (0.045) 
PRIN2 0.139 ** 0.144 ** -0.037 -0.039 (0.062) (0.061) (0.044) (0.044) 
PRIN3 0.233 ** 0.234 ** 0.034 0.030 (0.084) (0.087) (0.060) (0.063) 
PRIN4 0.171 * 0.179 ** -0.033 -0.035 (0.088) (0.087) (0.063) (0.063) 
PRINS -0.006 -0.003 -0.031 -0.032 
(0.101) (0.100) (0.073) (0.073) 
PRIN6 0.068 0.066 -0.008 -0. Oll 
(0.094) (0.096) (0.067) (0.070) 
PRIN7 -0.166 -0.192 * 0.045 0.050 (0.106) (0.111) (0.076) (0.080) 
PRINS -0.122 -0.093 0.079 0.072 
(0.114) (0.112) (0.081) (0.081) 
PRIN9 0.060 0.067 0.002 -0.001 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.092) (0.092) 
PRIN10 0.441 ** 0.477 ** -0.007 -0.019 (0.122) (0.122) (0.087) (0.089) 
MIEL 0.868 ** 0.927 ** 
-0.147 -0.173 
(0.417) (0.411) (0.297) (0.299) 
BIOT 0.470 0.797 1.386 
** 
1.267 
** (0.564) (0.575) (0.403) (0.419) 
NE\'iM -1.049 ** -1.067 ** 
O.llO 0.119 
(0.352) (0.346) (0.251) (0.252) 
TELE -0.211 0.120 0.050 0.159 
(0.468) (0.511) (0.334) (0.372) 
BURO -0.053 -0.173 0.229 0.037 
(0.513) (0.460) (0.366) (0.335) 
HOBO -0.001 -0.154 -0.078 -0.019 
(0.451) (0.449) (0.322) (0.327) 
AERO 0.301 ** 1. 214 ** 0. 011 0.035 (0.147) (0.577) (0.105) (0.420) 
NEh'R -0.907 * -0.875 * -0.490 -0.508 (0.504) (0.497) (0.359) (0.362) 
MEDI 0. ll3 0.311 -0.844 ** -0.895 ** (0.541) (0.560) (0.386) (0.408) 
AGRO -0.600 -0.571 0.543 0.534 
(0.506) (0.498) (0.361) (0.363) 
ENGI 0.322 0.328 -0.755 ** -0.790 ** (0.454) (0.453) (0.324) (0.330) 
PRIN13 0.011 0.001 
(0.032) (0.023) 
PRIN14 0.072 
** 
-0.028 
(0.033) (0.024) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
R2 0.498 0.527 0.351 0.362 
F 3.97 3.97 2.16 2.02 
(21,106) (23,106) (21,106) (23,106) 
========================================================~========~ 
~~P._l~-1 : Regression results from the strategy-performance relationship. 
Standard errors in parentheses, ** = significant at the 5 % level, * 
significant at the 10 % level (see footnote 19 for a description of the 
sectoral dummies). 
firms. The possible extra effects of combining the basic innovation 
strategy of the company with one of these market development strategies 
can be captured by the interaction variables PRIN13 = PRINHPRIN3 and 
PRIN14 = PRINl*PRIN4. The results in Table 7 suggest that the adoption 
of a focused strategy and innovation has a net effect on performance, 
which, given the magnitude of the point estimates, would render this 
combination as a viable alternative to large market developers investing 
in innovation. Without being too speculative, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that technological spill overs from R&D intensive companies are im-
portant behind this effect. 
With respect to industry differences, the coefficients of the indus-
try dummies suggest that micro-electronics and aeronautics are 
(significantly) more related to success, whereas new materials and re-
sources would lead to less successful innovations. 
Applying the same econometric structure for failure, the explanatory 
power decreases considerably. Failure of innovations is a process that 
needs to be distinguished from successful innovations. The observation 
that the more the company invests in innovations, the more failures oc-
cur, is straightforwardly related to the uncertain nature of the R&D 
process. Similarly biotechnology would seem to belong to the more risk-
ful, while medical equipment and engineering industries would seem to 
belong to the class of less riskful industries. 
The empirical findings appear to clearly support the proposition 
that multinational and domestic firms belong to different strategic 
groups within the investigated high-tech industries. The multinational 
firms focus on more aggressive innovative strategies that accompany the 
development of large markets, while domestic firms tend to focus more on 
small market niches and product differentiation and less emphasis on in-
novation. The different strategic positions appear to be significantly 
related to objective and subjective measures of performance and in that 
sense can be interpreted as rational choices. The strategic differences 
are in line with asymmetric game theoretic equilibria analyzed in ear-
lier sections. 
5. Conclusions. 
The existence of innovative strategic groups was explored in a game 
theoretic framework and documented from survey data analysis. In multi-
national industries, domestic firms compete with multinational companies 
in some but not all (output) market segments. The multinational firm 
supplies several different (national) markets. Its technological base is 
reflected in the products or services that it moves with relatively 
small transaction costs across markets. Domestic firms, on the other 
hand, face higher transaction costs and because of this, may serve a 
more limited market spectrum. 
The sketched asymmetries of multinational industries appear to be 
sufficient to result in a broad set of circumstances in stable asymme-
tric innovative strategies of the multinational and domestic firms. Fol-
lowing Brander and Spencer (1983), R&D investments were viewed as having 
a strategic dimension, because of their ability to influence the product 
rivalry game. Spin offs of R&D to the knowledge base of rival firms ap-
pear to be a significant determinant of innovative strategies. In situa-
tions where the between firm spin offs are identical, the multinational 
company was found to adopt a more innovative strategy than the domestic 
firm if it is positioned in a sufficiently important market segment. 
This tendency would result in a Nash feedback (subgame perfect) equili-
brium if R&D are strategic substitutes (in the Bulow et. al. (1985) ter-
minology) and certain functional specifications apply. The asymmetric 
strategic differences are reinforced if the multinational firm is pro-
ducing with a cost advantage and if the spin offs from the multinational 
R&D are low while those resulting from the domestic firm R&D are impor-
tant. The same strategic differences between multinational and domestic 
firms may apply, possibly reinforced, in situations with the former firm 
leading or both firms cooperatively deciding on R&D. 
In a feedback Nash equilibrium (with unimportant spin offs), the 
strategic dimension of R&D results in more industry R&D than would re-
sult with open loop strategies and the firms committing simultaneously 
to both R&D and output. This feature, however, may not hold with the 
firms cooperating on R&D. Complete cooperation on both R&D and output 
may also result in more industry R&D than with a joint venture limited 
to R&D. 
Survey data from companies operating in eleven high-tech multina-
tional industries were explored to search for differences in innovative 
strategies and performance. The survey approach obviously incorporates 
certain subjective assessments but did allow to infer the multidi-men-
sional nature of strategies that related to R&D, production and marke-
ting activities. The empirical analysis would seem to support the hy-
pothesis that multinational and domestic firms indeed do belong to dif-
ferent strategic groups within the investigated high-tech industries. 
The multinational companies appear to focus on more innovative strate-
gies that accompany the development of large markets, while domestic 
firms tend to be positioned in small market niches and/or emphasize pro-
duct differentiation. The different strategies are all related signifi-
cantly to success. 
All of the statements involving a comparison of equilibria can be 
verified with the aid of the mean value theorem (see Brander and Spencer 
(1983)). For the reader's convenience the essential points are repeated 
here. Let r*, s* and r·, s· denote two possible R&D equilibria and let 
b. r = r* - r ·, D. s = s* - s ·, and 
(1,) 
( 3,) 
with vm and Vd objective functions defined by (5) and (6) in the text 
and the subscripts denoting partial differentiation. (The equations are 
easily adapted for the investigation of the cooperative equilibria). 
According to the mean value theorem there exists a point AVrm = VrrmAr + 
Vrsmt:,s and AVsd = VsrdAr + VssdAs where the cross partial derivatives 
are evaluated at some point "between" (r*,s*) and cr·,s·). 
Cramer's rule yields 
D ( 4') 
(5,) 
(6') 
with D = (Vrrm.Vssd- Vrsm.Vsrd) >0 (because of assumed stability. Vrsm 
< 0 and Vsrd < 0 for r and s strategic substitutes, 
Vrrm < 0, Vssd < 0 for the second order optimality condition, and 
Vssct < Vsrct, Vrrm< Vrsm assumed. 
To compare the magnitudes of r and s in a given equilibrium, it is 
supposed that at a symmetric equilibrium Vsd(r·,s·) = 0 holds. (Say that 
the reaction curve ds/dr crosses the bisecting line at that point. 
Existence is assumed, hence the strategic substitute property needs to 
hold in a sufficiently wide range of r and s values). By definition 
Vsd(r*,s*) = 0 and Vsd(r·,s·) = 0. Also Vrm(r*,s*) = 0 and only 
Vrm(r·,s·) needs to be evaluated, which can be done using Vsd(r·,s·) = 
0. For a feedback Nash equilibrium the partial derivatives are: 
2u* 
Vrm = avm;ar = [2 dam/dx- 13.0mct.do:djdy] 
( 4-132) 
+ w* da2m/dx - l = 0, 
2v* 
Vsd = avct;as = [2 dadfdy- 13.0ctm.do:Im/dx]- l = 0, 
( 4-132) 
x* = r* + 0ctm s*, y* = s* + 0ffid r*, and u*, v*, w* defined by (3). 
The ~N expressions of the text follow after some manipulation, using 
the specified functional forms of 0:1 m, ad and a2m. The stated claims 
follow easily from checking (4') and (6'). A similar reasoning can be 
applied for the other equilibrium concepts. 
A.3.1. Stackelberg leadership in output and R&D. 
The Stackelberg game with the multinational firm leading results in 
the second stage the following output levels 
( 4-(32 )md - 2!3ml m 
u = v = w = (7') 
2(2-(32 ) 4(2-(32 ) 26 
with ([3/2) < m1m/mct < (4-[32 )/2[3. The domestic firm is also follower with 
respect to R&D and solves in the first stage 
max vct = ~d(u(r,s), v(r,s),r,s) - s 
s 
taking r as given and noting (7'). The reaction functions= s(r) of 
this firm is implicitly defined by: 
v 
avct;as = [(4-[32).dadjdy- 2.[3.0ctm dalm/dx]- l = 0 (8') 
2 (2-132 ) 
The multinational takes this best response function as given and solves 
max vm = ~m(u(r,s), v(r,s),r) - r again noting (7'). The Stackelberg 
r 
equilibrium solves therefore (7'), (8') and 
( 4-132 ) u 
a vm /a r = o = ------- [ ( 2 da1 m I dx - f3. 0m ct . dact 1 dy. ) + 
4(2-(32 ) 
+ (2.0ctm da1m/dx- [3.dadjdy) dsldr] 
+ ( w 0ct m da::: m I dx) . ds / dr + w daz m I dx - 1 
( 9') 
A.3.2. Cooperation in R&D, Nash in output. 
The Nash output levels of stage two are defined by ( 3) . The 
cooperative feedback R&D levels r·, s·, solve 
2 
Vr = oVIor = [ u (Z.da1mldx- ~.dadldy. 0md) 
( 4-(32) 
+ v ( 2 . 0m d dad I dy - [3 • da1 rn I dx) ] + w da2 m / dx - 1 
(lO') 
and 
2 
Vs = oVIos = 
( 4-~2) 
( ll,) 
Substitution from (10') and (11') in the Nash expressions (7) and (8) 
with the specified functional forms yields 
2v 
Vrm(r· ,s·) = ( [3kl 0 - 20md) ( 12') 
( 4-~2) 
and 
2 
Vs d ( r ·, s •) = - [ u(21{l 0 0ctrn - [3) + Wkl 0 0ct rn] (13') 
3 
metric solution is optimal and applying the methodology outlined above 
to (12') and (13') provides the results of Table 2 in the text. 
A.3.3. Cooperation in output and R&D 
Cooperation in the ~utput stage , results in output levels defined 
-
by (27) and (28). In the first stage V = vm + Vd is maximized taking 
these output levels into account. The optimal values result from 
(14') 
and 
( 15') 
Substitution from (14') and (15') into the R&D cooperation-Nash output 
expressions (10') and (ll') provides 
and 
sign Vr(r,s) =-sign {~2}.{[mlm [(4+5p2).kl - ~.0md.(S+p2)] 
- md [(4+5(32 ).0md- (8+(32).[3.kl]} 
= [(r + 0ctm s)/(s + 0mct r)]>J- 1 • The results of Table 3 
be verified using the mean value theorem methodology. 
(16') 
(17,) 
can now 
Notes 
l Or a strategy along some other dimension, related for 
example to market or firm organisation. 
2 It may be difficult to monitor the licensee's output 
because of asymmetry in information and/or imitation 
possibilities. Then fixed fee licensing is appropriate 
and will not always be privately or socially optimal (see 
Katz and Shapiro (1985 fr.-·---·s-e-e·-also "Itamieii .. and Tauman (1984) . 
3 Hence the envisaged race is not of the "winner-take-all" 
variety (cfr. Stewart (1983))":···· 
4 Given that 13 = 1 in the demand specification and that the 
intercepts a1m = ad = a independent of x and y. The 
marginal costs would depend on x andy, i.e. c1m = c1m(x), 
cd = cct (y) and c2m = c2m (x). 
5 The demand functions that accompany the inverse demand 
specifications given in the text, are for 13 < 1 
u = ( a1 m - l3ad 
v = (ad - (3a1 m 
Plm + 13pd)j(l-13)(1+13) and 
pd + 13Plm)/(l-13)(1+(3) 
It is assumed throughout the paper that asymmetries allow 
both firms to have a positive demand. 
For 13 = 1 and perfect between firm spin offs, a1m = act = a 
and x = y, products of both firms are perfect substitutes with 
common price Plm = pd =a -(u+v). 
More general linear specifications can be analyzed. 
6 See Van Cayseele (1986) for spin offs and the timing of 
innovations. 
7 See J.A. Brander and B.J. Spencer (1983), for results in 
a one market symmetric firm case. 
8 Discounting is ignored to simplify computations without 
loss of significance. 
9 Fulfillment of the second order conditions as well as 
stability and uniqueness will be assumed. 
10 This is the situation with R&D being a strategic 
substitute in the terminology of Bulow ef:······ar: .. ··(l985). 
The······siope····of the reaction curves are dr/ds = -Vrsm/Vrrm 
and ds/dr = -Vsrd/Vssd with subscripts denoting partial 
differentiation. Strategic substitutes (complements) 
refer to Vrsm < 0, Vsrct < 0 (Vrsm > 0, Vsrct > 0). It can 
can be verified that the cross partial derivatives may, 
but are not necessarily negative sloping. 
11 This last condition implies reaction function stability. 
See also Brander and Spencer (1983). 
12 The statements can be verified \vi th the methods described 
in Appendix l. 
13 Note that an increase in R&D of one firm increases the 
marginal profitability of an output change in both firms, 
if spill overs are positive and only of the firm itself 
if spill overs are zero. With zero spill overs the effect 
of increased R&D is to push the (downward) sloping 
reaction curves outward and output increases for the firm 
changing R&D (decreases for the other). With positive 
spill overs both reaction curves change with a change in 
R&D and the net effect appears unclear in general. 
14 Differences in this regard can easily be incorporated, as 
long as the ~ parameter stays common, without relevant 
consequences for the main inferences. 
15 See footnote 7. 
16 The bounds are for symmetric levels of R&D, hence they 
can easily be interpreted from equation (15). The 
restrictions need in any case to be satisfied at the Nash 
equilibrium. 
17 It can be verified that the leading multinational firm will 
spend more on R&D than the domestic firm if and only if 1/J s 
is positive, with 
- md[kl.2.p.(3-p2 ).(l-0ctm) + (l2-8p2+p4)- p2.(3-p2).0ctmJ 
+ m2m.b.[l6(2-p2)2- (4-p2)2]jo 
and u defined by equation (7') of the Appendix and k1 defined by 
equation (14) in the text. 
18 Given (12) 
av* 
sign 
av* ar 
and 
a7tm av* 
sign 
av* as 
a Jtct 
+ ---
au* 
()1td 
+ ---
au* 
au* 
= 
ar 
au* 
= 
as 
with k1* = [(r* + 0ctm.s*)/(s* + 0md.r*)]>~-l > 0 
19 Cfr. the discussion following equation (11) above. The 
result is dependent on the assumption 
Vss - Vrs < 0 and Vrr - Vsr < 0 
(see Brander and Spencer (1983) or the Appendix 1). 
20 For similar results in symmetric games, see Reinganum 
(1981) and Katz (1985). 
21 The R&D investment of the multinational technology r is 
greater (smaller) than the domestic effort s in the 
cooperative venture, if and only if ~j is positive 
(negative), with 
~j = m1 m . [ k. ( l-0ct m ) + (3 • ( 1-0m d ) ] 
- rod • [ (3. k. ( l-0ct m) + (1-0m d ) ) + lll2 ( 1-!32 ) • k. ( l-0ct m) / o 
with k evaluated at a symmetric solution. The first column of 
Table 3 can now be verified. 
22 The proof rests on a comparison of (26) and (27) 
evaluated at u = v and w*, with the expression between 
square brackets in (19) and (20) evaluated at u* and v* 
and w*. To verify that the Nash output is larger than the 
cooperative levels for equal knowledge levels employ the 
restriction on the margins implied by positive output. 
Application of the mean value methodology yields the 
claim in the text. 
23 The survey centered on the development of products, based 
on three rapidly evolving technologies: 
- micro electronics: MIEL 
- bio-technology: BIOT 
- new materials: NEWM 
and the processing of these products jn the follm..;ing 
application industries: 
- Telematics: TELE 
- Burotics: BURO 
- Robotics: ROBO 
- Aeronautics: AERO 
- New energy resources: NEWR 
- Medical technology: MEDI 
- Agro-industries: AGRO 
- Engineering: ENGI 
24 The authors would like to thank Prof. P. Vanden Abeele 
and I. Christiaens for kindly providing the survey 
data. The survey was inspired by the work of Cooper (1983). 
25 No eigenvalues higher than one were obtained for factors 
beyond the first two ones. 
26 The results where they are cc~1sidered as a separate class 
will be reported elsewhere. 
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